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ABSTRACT
Newly discovered domestic crude oil has caused large increases in rail traffic and an associated increase in
derailments. In principle, derailments expose railroads to liabilities that can be very large, but railroads are
protected as long as they comply with federal guidelines. Despite this, the railroads took it upon themselves
to design a safer rail car. The railroads have also lobbied federal agencies to make the new standards part of
regulation. This paper addresses two puzzles. First, why would the railroads expend resources on self-
regulation when protected from tort? Second, why would the railroads push to have these stricter standards
enshrined in federal regulation? We conclude that the answer lies in regulatory and legal uncertainty coupled
with using regulators to overcome a collective action problem.
INTRODUCTION
Shale oil is far more volatile than other sources of
hydrocarbons. In fact, some in the industry refer to
oil rail tank cars as “rolling bombs” (Gurney, 2015).
What’s more, given the way that railways were
constructed and the way that many cities sprang up
around rail lines, these bombs roll past a large
percentage of America’s population every day.
Train derailments and the resulting oil spills have
made the news in recent years. This should not be
surprising given the dramatic increase in American
oil production from shale and the numerous political
and regulatory obstacles to the construction of oil
pipelines to transport this output. More oil trans-
ported by rail will naturally lead to an increase in oil
spills from rail accidents. These accidents have
resulted in court cases and calls for increased
regulation of the industry.
The issue this paper addresses is not the danger that
crude by rail (CBR) poses to the American popula-
tion. The issue addressed is, instead, the industry’s
reaction to this danger and to the threat of regula-
tion. Instead of fighting regulation the industry has
been requesting increased regulation for years.
Moreover, they have voluntarily imposed safety
standards that are well in excess of what their
regulators require.
Lest this appear to be simply a case of optimal self-
regulation, the story becomes even more interesting.
While Congress has refused to pass liability caps on
damages from rail accidents, they did pass legisla-
tion that protects railways against tort suits as long
as railroads comply with existing federal safety
standards.
Thus, the issue: railways are protected from tort as
long as they comply with existing standards, and yet
the railroads lobby for increasingly stringent stan-
dards. What can explain this?
The paper is structured as follows. First, we present
a brief history of rail carriage and derailments. Next,
we examine the regulatory and legal environment.
Third, we discuss the efforts that the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) have made in an at-
tempt to improve the safety of CBR. Fourth, we
assess the possible explanations for AAR behavior
and determine that the association is being driven by
the goal of self-regulation, but is seeking to use
regulatory bodies as a means to overcome a collec-
tive action problem.
Derailments and Fatalities
Since July 2013, there have been over fourteen
derailments of crude oil trains resulting in 3.3 million
gallons of spilled crude oil and 48 fatalities (Associ-
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ated Press, 2016). The worst derailment occurred
in July 2013 when an oil train derailed in Lac-
Mégantic, Quebec killing 47 and causing over $1
billion in damages.
The most recent derailment occurred in June 2016
when 12 tank cars derailed spilling 42,000 gallons
of crude oil, some of which made its way into the
Columbia river. A fire broke out and local residents
were asked to boil their water for several days.
Political and regulatory headwinds make construc-
tion of new pipelines a long-term endeavor. The
next best alternative is transporting crude oil by rail
(CBR). With the advent of horizontal drilling and the
new success of recovering oil from tight shale
formations with hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”)
technology, CBR averaged more than 1 million
barrels per day (bb/d) in 2014. This compares to
55,000 bb/d in 2010 (U.S. Energy Information
administration, 2014). Although several billion
dollars have been spent by railroads for mainte-
nance and repair over many decades, much of the
infrastructure was completed in the early 1900’s,
and many of the tank cars carrying crude oil are
based on designs that are forty to fifty years old.
The vast majority of tank cars are owned by large
leasing companies. All U.S. railroads combined own
no more than 440 tank cars (Kahn, 2014).
This latest surge of crude oil has a tendency to be
more flammable, and in fact has shown to be
explosive.
THE RAILROAD REGULATORY ENVI-
RONMENT
Over the last 150 years a host of laws, acts and
regulations covering the railroad industry have been
instituted by the federal government with varying
intentions and consequences. These laws are
particularly important given the tendency of the
courts to hold that federal railroad tort regulation
pre-empts state law.
Today the primary regulating body is the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) under the U.S.
Department of Transportation (USDOT). Second-
ary regulating bodies include the Surface Transpor-
tation Board (STB), the Pipeline and Hazardous
Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The
STB regulates topics from shipper complaints (i.e.
collusion, price fixing, etc.) to monitoring shipping
rates to approving new rail lines. PHMSA works
with the industry to develop regulations and specifi-
cations for the transport of hazardous material such
as ethanol and crude oil. Proposed new regulations
for the railroad industry are passed upward from
lower level regulating bodies (PHMSA) to the FRA
to the USDOT. The NTSB is the primary investiga-
tive body in incidents involving derailments and
provides safety recommendations based upon
investigative outcomes.
The railroads have developed their own body that
works with federal regulators. The Association of
American Railroads (AAR) represents the railroad
industry on issues involving legislation, lobbying and
safety. AAR has a wholly-owned subsidiary, the
Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI)
located in Colorado. The relationship of the FRA
and AAR is such that according to their website,
“TTCI manages the Federal Railroad
Administration’s (FRA) Transportation Technology
Center (TTC). TTC is operated under a care,
custody and control contract with the FRA” (Asso-
ciation of American Railroads, n.d.).
Rail Transport Law
According to U.S. Code6, “A rail carrier providing
transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction
of the Board under this part shall provide the
transportation or service on reasonable request.”
The important phrase here is “...shall provide….”
Additionally, Interstate Commerce Act common law
doctrine for railroads states, it is “…the duty of
common carriers to transport all goods offered for
transportation” (Abel, 2011). Therefore, railroads
as common carriers must accept crude oil for
transportation regardless of how volatile it may be,
and regardless of any additional costs that the
carrier will incur in effecting safe transportation.
The other important component of this discussion is
carrier liability. Continuing under the Interstate
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Commerce Act. “…the originating carrier and
delivering carrier on a movement on a thru bill of
lading are liable to the lawful holder of the bill of
lading or delivery receipt or any party entitled to
recover thereon, for the full actual loss, damage or
injury to the property being transported caused by it
or any common carrier, railroad or transportation
company on which line the property moved. The
statute specifically provides that no contract, re-
ceipt, rule, regulation or other limitation of any
character shall exempt the carriers from such
liability” (Hardman and Winter, 1975). In case of
derailment or accident, the railroad is responsible to
compensate the shipper for the full value of dam-
aged product. This liability widens considerably
when materials such as crude oil are released into
the environment and/or cause fire.
Railroads have a working relationship with the
federal government bridged by the Federal Railroad
Administration. From a rail safety perspective, the
guiding doctrine is the Federal Railroad Safety Act
(FRSA) which was passed by Congress in 1970.
The Act contains the laws and regulations that the
railroads must adhere to across the U.S. Some
states have passed additional laws or regulations
pertaining to the railroads, however, the vast major-
ity of court cases have ruled the FRSA supersedes
state law (Rodgers, 1993).
The only blanket exception from liability falls under
the Price-Anderson Act (U.S. Department of
Transportation, 2008). Under this act, contractors
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S.
Department of Energy enter into agreements of
indemnification that cover personal injury and
property damage to those harmed by a nuclear or
radiological incident.
The railroads completely understand their legal
obligation to transport freight, even when that freight
is a hazardous material. They also understand that
their liability for accidents involving hazardous
material could total millions of dollars per incident.
The railroads have called on Congress to pass
liability caps to help protect them. Congress has
refused such requests. Congress however did pass
legislation that protect against tort suits targeting
railroads as long as Federal safety and security
standards are met (Shaffer and Smith, 2014).
CBR Transport Vessels
The DOT 111A tank car was designed in the
1960’s and is the workhorse for liquid transport by
the railroad industry. It can transport a wide variety
of materials, both flammable and nonflammable. It
became the target of more focused scrutiny in the
early 2000’s when ethanol began to transverse the
country in large quantities. Approximately 65,000
DOT-111 tanker cars are currently in service
carrying crude oil, ethanol and other flammable
liquids. Each car can carry up to 30,000 gallons of
material. Cost estimates to upgrade the DOT-111
fleet run as high as $5 billion.
In August 2011, the AAR Tank Car Committee in
collaboration with railroads and shippers developed
a new standard for tank car design. Beginning in the
fall of 2011 all new tank car orders are mandated to
be constructed to the new design standard called
the CPC (Casualty Prevention Circular)-1232. This
design and its associated upgrades were entirely
industry driven. Approximately 14,000 CPC-1232
cars are in service today.
EXPLANATIONS FOR INDUSTRY BEHAV-
IOR: PLEASE REGULATE US
The story of the railroads seeking increased regula-
tion by the federal government is an example of
neither a pure rent seeking activity nor purely self-
regulation. Rather, uncertainty surrounding whether
legal rules will be enforced has the railroads looking
for cover in the realm of political relations.
Rent-Seeking & Legal Enforcement
On paper, it appears that the railroads are well
protected in the event of accidents. As long as the
railroads comply with federal safety protocols, they
are largely protected from tort suits. Of course, if
this was a certainty, there would either be incentive
to lobby for decreased safety standards or, if such
lobbying was stymied or unsuccessful, there would
be little subsequent incentive for the rail companies
to lobby further.
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What is likely, however, is that there should be no
incentive for lobbying to increase safety standards.
Self-Regulation
In a world of optimal legal regulation, where the
least cost avoider is liable for any damages, or even
one that was suboptimal but where the rules were
clear and stable, it would be entirely understandable
and expected for investment to be made into safety
standards and tanker improvements. Of course, it
would be expected that an optimal level of less than
perfect safety would be reached.
This story certainly matches the experience in the
rail carriage industry…but only up to a point. With
shale oil came a dramatic increase in the volatility of
the crude being carried. This increase in volatility, in
a world of clear and stable legal doctrine, should
have brought about a subsequent increase in the
safety measures taken. In addition, the fairly con-
stant increase in population of major metropoles, the
increased value of assets subject to damage, and the
increased perception of the risk of terrorism would
also have caused an increase in the optimal amount
of safety precautions as time progressed.
The increase in safety precautions advocated by the
AAR are, then, entirely in line with what we would
expect. In this instance, however, there would be no
reason for the organization to lobby for the govern-
ment agencies to increase their standards.
Public Relations
It is, of course, entirely possible (and even prob-
able) that the rail companies were not looking to
achieve optimal self-regulation. It is also possible
that their main goal was not to lobby in order to
have safety standards in their favor. Rather, it may
be that they believe that the true battleground is
neither in the courts nor in Congress. It may be that
their primary purpose is to shift the debate in the
public sphere–in effect a marketing or PR campaign.
The idea here would be that the rail companies fear
that regardless of their legal liability, exploding train
cars are so salient an issue for the public that one of
two things will happen: either the courts will fail to
follow legal doctrine or government officials will feel
compelled to revoke the protections currently in
place.
If this is the case there still remains a serious ques-
tion. Lower government standards than those in use
by the railroads would, if anything, strengthen the
companies’ PR position. Holding constant the
number of accidents as well as the safety standards
in actual use, the railroads being able to point to
their standards and issue press releases highlighting
how much they’d spent in excess of what was
required, how much more stringent their standards
were than the requirements would surely be a
stronger defense in the public relations arena than
stating that they meet the standards mandated by the
government agencies.
The upshot is that, while rail companies and the
AAR are certainly aware of the public relation
dimension to CBR carriage and any accidents or
explosions, this is not sufficient to explain their push
for the increase in government safety standards.
Barriers to Entry
A common explanation for industry members’
pushing for increased safety regulation within the
economics literature is that it can serve as a barrier
to entry and thereby decrease competition ((Stigler,
1971). This should mean an increase in profitability
within an industry compared to what it would be
with lower barriers to entry.
In order for increased safety regulation to benefit
incumbents, however, one of the following must be
true: either incumbents must be grandfathered in and
not be subject to the regulations, the cost of regula-
tory compliance must be lower for incumbents, or
both.
Obviously, if incumbents are not subject to the
regulations then the increased safety standards will
increase the operating costs for new entrants but not
for the incumbents. This will decrease entry into the
industry and make life easier for the incumbents.
If it is lower cost to comply with the regulations for
incumbents than it is for entrants then the more
Vol. 28 No. 1
11
stringent regulations will serve the same role. Less
obviously, if there are economies of scale to compli-
ance and the incumbents are larger than the typical
challenger then increased safety requirements would
be attractive to incumbents.
To what extent, then, does this explanation apply to
CBR and the rail companies?
It seems obvious that there are large economies of
scale in safety compliance. We need only look to
the amount spent by the AAR to see that. To some
extent, then, this could be the main driver. The
question now is the extent to which the incumbent
carriers are better able to exploit the gains from
trade compared to new entrants.
The railroad industry faced tough economic condi-
tions in the 1970’s with nearly a third of the industry
facing bankruptcy. That condition began to change
with the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980 which
allowed railroads to discontinue unprofitable routes,
downsize personnel numbers, set rates, enter into
long-term contracts and merge with competitors that
had healthier balance sheets. By 2016, four major
railroads (Norfolk Southern, CSX, Union Pacific
and Burlington Northern Santa Fe) controlled over
90% of the railroad freight revenue generated in the
U.S. These four regional monopolies are largely
regulated at the federal level (Kimes, 2011).
Given the massive fixed cost of establishing new rail
networks it seems unlikely that additional regulation
was sought to deter aspiring rail barons. Existing
firms have already incurred those fixed costs and
they have, by now, become sunk costs. New
entrants, however, would be obliged to incur all of
these costs themselves and would, in fact, incur
higher fixed costs than the incumbents.
The reasons that the setup costs for new entrants
would be higher are threefold. First of all, much of
the land that any new networks would run through is
more valuable now due to population growth and
urbanization over the last two centuries. Secondly,
greater population density in urban areas means that
acquiring the necessary permits would be costlier,
perhaps prohibitively so. Finally, at least west of the
Mississippi, incumbents were granted sections of
land in order to encourage expansion. It is very
unlikely that this generosity would be repeated with
any aspiring rail company today.
Before we discard this explanation, however, we
should consider competition more broadly. It is
possible that the competitors at issue were trucking
companies. Clearly trucking companies are much
smaller than rail companies and, if they were subject
to the more rigorous safety standards this could
make it much harder for them to compete.
The reality, of course, is that carrying CBR over any
distance is far less costly than on the roads. The
only financially viable competitors for CBR would
be pipelines and shipping and increasing the safety
standards for CBR will have no direct impact upon
the cost of operating a pipeline or on the shipping
technology required. It may create a regulatory
environment that would be stricter when evaluating
pipeline projects but this is a distant enough pros-
pect to be extremely unlikely. Moreover, pipeline
projects already face significant and often insur-
mountable obstacles.
The upshot is that, while the erection of barriers is
common elsewhere and perhaps even in other areas
in which the rail companies operate, it cannot
explain the companies’ behavior in this regard.
Collective Action
The willingness of companies to contribute to the
legal defense of others following the Lac-Mégantec
accident points us towards the difficulties of some
creating problems for the rest of the group. In other
words, there is some spillover from oil spills.
It is difficult to assess exactly what this spillover is
but there is definitely concern about possible con-
gressional reaction to accidents (Gurney, 2015). In
other words, the concern would be not that the legal
rules would not be applied in a specific instance
(although this is also probably a concern). Rather, it
would be that one railroad’s lack of diligence (or
simply bad luck) could have a deleterious impact
upon the regulatory and legal environment for all.
Headline grabbing accidents that either result in a
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legal precedent for greater liability for railroads or in
the removal of congressional protection would be
problematic for all members of the industry not just
the miscreant.
CONCLUSION
In the end, it is a combination of points that yields a
meaningful explanation. Railroads’ safety measures
(or lack thereof) have significant spillovers upon
other railroads through possible greater regulation
and/or legal liability. Individual railroads can adopt
more rigorous standards than those required of
them, and they will both be less likely to experience
accidents or adverse legal judgements. Other
railroad’s safety precautions could severely and
negatively impact the “safe” railroad through higher
legal costs, compliance costs, or even closure of
routes through population centers. While the AAR
offers a venue for collective action to address the
spillover problem to a certain extent, the enforce-
ment of self-regulation will simply be more effective
with the cudgel of the state behind it.
The regulated are requesting more regulation. If the
railroads can prove that they have adopted a
proactive posture in regard to transportation of
hazardous materials and are adhering to the rules
and laws as mandated by the federal government,
then they feel like they have some level of political
and financial cover in case of catastrophe. And
they’re probably right.
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